Abstract: Analysis of Competing Hypothesis, a method for evaluating explanations of observed evidence, is used in numerous fields including counterterrorism, psychology, and intelligence analysis. We propose a Bayesian extension of the methodology, posing the problem in terms of a multinomial-Dirichlet hierarchical model. The yet-to-be observed true hypothesis is regarded as a multinomial random variable and the evaluation of the evidence is treated as a structured elicitation of a prior distribution on the probabilities of the hypotheses. This model provides the user with measures of uncertainty for the probabilities of the hypotheses. We discuss inference such as point and interval estimates of hypothesis probabilities, ratios of hypothesis probabilities, and Bayes factors. A simple example involving the stadium relocation of the San Diego Chargers is used to illustrate the method. We also present several extensions of the model that enable it to handle special types of evidence including evidence that is irrelevant to one or more hypotheses, evidence against hypotheses, and evidence that is subject to deception.
Introduction
Analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH) is a method for systematically comparing the likelihoods of competing hypotheses based on the available evidence. Richards Heuer [4] developed the procedure for the CIA in the 1970s, primarily for use in intelligence matters. Heuer's work did not provide a mathematical basis for drawing conclusions, though he did note that formalizing the process would be desirable. A software program from PARC [6] attempts to make ACH quantitative by reporting an inconsistency score for each hypothesis. Paté-Cornell [7] and McLaughlin [5] both present a Bayesian method for updating beliefs in hypotheses as evidence is obtained. The model we present here is richer than that presented in Paté-Cornell, though it is based on a similar idea.
Multinomial-Dirichlet Hierarchical Model
The multinomial-Dirichlet model is a generalization of the beta-binomial model in which there are N categories rather than the two categories success and failure. A draw from a multinomial distribution is represented by a vector x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N ), where each x j is the count of observations that fall into category j. Let p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p N ) denote the probabilities of belonging to the N categories so that N j=1 p j = 1 and let n = N j=1 x j . A Dirichlet distribution is placed on p, the category probabilities of the multinomial distribution. The parameter for the Dirichlet distribution is α = (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α N ), a vector with nonnegative entries. Letting α 0 = N j=1 α j , the marginal distribution of each p j is a beta distribution.
The multinomial and Dirichlet distributions are conjugate to one another, meaning that when we start with a Dirichlet prior distribution on the category probabilities and update our knowledge with multinomial data, the resulting posterior distribution on the category (or hypothesis) probabilities is Dirichlet. Specifically, when the prior distribution on p is Dirichlet(α), and multinomial data x is observed, the posterior distribution on p, conditioned on this data, is Dirichlet(α 1 + x 1 , α 2 + x 2 , . . . , α N + x N ).
To pose ACH in terms of multinomial and Dirichlet distributions, we consider the final outcome, or determination of the true hypothesis to be a single draw from a multinomial distribution. Evaluating the evidence provides information about p, the parameter of this multinomial distribution, which gives the probabilities of the hypotheses.
Algorithm
The algorithm for implementing our procedure is as follows; Step 1 corresponds to steps 1, 2, and 3 of Heuer's method.
Step 2 is a formalization of Heuer's call to "Analyze the diagnosticity of the evidence and arguments". The method of assigning x ij values in Step 3 is posed as in McLaughlin [5] , though we note here that 0 values are permitted for x ij . An alternative way to elicit x ij values is to interpret it as the number of "observations" of H j with which E i can be associated. Written out formally, we have
where y is the outcome we are trying to predict.
Inference
All inference is conducted using the posterior distribution. The mean of the posterior Dirichlet(α) distribution iŝ
Interval estimates provide a measure of uncertainty for the point estimates above, but numerical methods are required to find quantiles of beta and Dirichlet distributions. A 95% equal-tail credible set for a single probability p j is obtained by finding the .025 and .975 quantiles of the beta(α j , α 0 − α j ) distribution. Highest posterior density sets [2] will be slightly narrower than the equaltail sets. The width of these interval estimates is strongly affected by the choice of n ess .
Extensions
The multinomial-Dirichlet ACH model, as presented thus far yields a Dirichlet posterior distribution on the hypotheses that is easy to compute and easy to use for conducting inference. However, it is missing the ability to handle items that give evidence against one or more hypotheses, items that are not relevant to all hypotheses, and items which may be subject to deception. Unfortunately these extensions result in posterior distributions that are not Dirichlet and this loss of conjugacy makes inference more difficult. The use of Monte Carlo methods, however, makes inference computationally feasible, and samples from the posterior can be obtained fairly quickly.
Evidence Against
Evidence against hypothesis H k is expressed as seeing observations that do not fall into category k. In a beta-binomial setting, where there is only one category that is "not H k ", this is easy to handle. In a Dirichlet model, the observations need to be allocated amongst all the categories that are "not H k " without changing the relative probabilities of these other hypotheses and without changing our certainty about the relative probabilities of these other hypotheses. This is accomplished by treating the evidence against as a binomial random variable with probability of success 1−p k . We know the observations belong to the "not H k " categories, but we do not know how many observations fall into each. If an evidence item E i is against a set of hypotheses, rather than just a single hypothesis H k , it is "for" the complement of this set which we will refer to as F i . Then the evidence is treated as a binomial random variable with probability of success j∈Fi p j . Let our current knowledge of p be given by a proper prior distribution π(p), and let E i provide evidence for a set of hypotheses F i , with the strength of this evidence represented by w i . Then, the posterior distribution for p, updated with E i is given by
In practice, an analyst would input plus and minus signs in the matrix to indicate evidence for and against hypotheses and use w i to represent j∈Fi x ij .
Irrelevance
When a piece of evidence is irrelevant to hypothesis H k , it is as though the data associated with H k is missing. It is not appropriate to assign x ik = 0 when E i is not relevant to H k as this would reduce the likelihood of H k relative to the other hypotheses when it should be held constant. Let our current knowledge of p again be given by the distribution π(p), and let E i be relevant only to hypotheses in R i . Then, the posterior distribution for p, updated with E i is
This posterior distribution is guaranteed to be proper if the prior distribution is proper.
Combining Different Types of Evidence
When a user decides to enter an evidence item as either for, against, or irrelevant to a hypothesis, the posterior distribution for p is no longer in closed form. In order to express the posterior, we partition the evidence by type into three sets. Evidence items with only numerical values will belong to set A. Evidence items that contain irrelevant hypotheses (NA's) will be labeled as set B. Evidence items that are just for (+) and against (-) will belong to set C. Items that contain both an NA, and + or -will be placed into set C. Evidence in set C may not contain numeric values. Using Equations (1), (2), and (3) the posterior distribution for any set of evidence is given by
where N is the number of hypotheses, R i is the set of relevant hypotheses for evidence item i, F i is the set of hypotheses that item i provides evidence for (+), and w i is the scaled weight for evidence item i. Importance sampling is used to sample from the distribution. Table 1 shows the scaled input of an analyst who used the extensions proposed. n ess was again chosen to be 10. There are four evidence items with complete numeric values belonging to set A (E 3 , E 5 , E 6 , E 7 ), one with an irrelevant hypothesis belonging to set B (E 4 ), and one with evidence for and against belonging to set C (E 2 ). The posterior distribution for p is π(p|E)
Stadium Example with Extensions
Computing i∈A x ij , the column sums for evidence items in A, gives α = (2.78, 2.69, 1.53). Next, we update α with evidence in B to obtain α * . E 4 = (.67, .33, N A) gives the updated value α * = (3.30, 2.95, 1.75). Finally, we update α * with evidence in C to obtain α * * . E 2 = (+, +, −) gives α * * = (4.36, 3.89, 1.75). We now have a close Dirichlet distribution to use as an importance function for importance sampling. Table 2 summarizes the results of the posterior containing estimates of the mean, 95% HPD intervals, and p max with a Monte Carlo sample size of 100, 000. Figure 1 displays the true marginal posteriors along with the importance function. Results are quite similar to the previous assignment of matrix values, with Oceanside having a slightly higher posterior mean in this assignment. Since either of these special types of evidence can be interpreted as missing data, there will generally be more variance in the posterior distribution when "NA", "+", and "-" are used than when all matrix entries are numeric.
Deception
A third type of evidence that can be incorporated into this model is evidence with the potential for deception. The analyst can assign θ i values which indicate the probability of deception, or continue to add hyperpriors to the set-up, perhaps placing a beta distribution on the θ i . Once again, the posterior distribution cannot be obtained in closed form, but Monte Carlo methods make inference possible.
Discussion
The aim of this paper was to give a probabilistic framework for ACH that is sophisticated enough to provide measures of certainty while at the same time providing a simple interface and easy to interpret output for users who may not have a great deal of training in probability theory. We did not delve into the psychology of reasoning or human logic, seeking only to give a statistical formalization of an existing method for assessing evidence. Our approach involves viewing ACH as a structured elicitation of a prior distribution by equating evidence to multinomial observations. The ability to weight evidence items by importance or diagnosticity is a great advantage of our model over simpler approaches such Paté-Cornell's. In the simpler set-up, updating with a single signal or evidence item E results in the same posterior distribution on the hypotheses whether the prior for H is noninformative or based on hundreds of other evidence items.
We admit that the assignment of weights to hypotheses can seem overly subjective as can the assignment of an equivalent sample size n ess . One can always examine the sensitivity of conclusions to these choices, though care should be taken that these parameters are not manipulated to obtain a preconceived conclusion. Weed [9] provides a review of the concept of "weight of evidence".
We conclude with a comment on diagnosticity and discrimination. Some ACH guides call for discarding evidence with little diagnostic power. Heuer refers to the diagnosticity of a piece of evidence as its helpfulness in judging the relative likelihoods of the hypotheses. Unfortunately, this can be misinterpreted to mean that an item of evidence should be discarded if it does not help you choose one hypothesis or set of hypotheses over another hypothesis or set of hypotheses; i.e. if it does not push the probabilities of the hypotheses closer to 0 and 1. Such a piece of evidence does not help to discriminate between hypotheses, but it may still be diagnostic. When measuring the uncertainty of our estimates, we want to include relevant evidence even if it tells us that the relative likelihoods of two hypotheses become closer to one another. Excluding nondiscriminatory evidence will likely result in higher likelihood ratios for hypotheses. This is analogous to the problem arising from medical journals that only publish papers with results significant at the .05 level. Canvassing journals to perform meta-analysis on like studies results in overestimating treatment effects because studies with insignificant effects are excluded. Heuer cites psychological studies in which experts' certainty in their evaluations becomes higher with more evidence even though the quality of their evaluations remains the same. Including all relevant evidence, regardless of its discriminatory power could mediate this effect. 
